In the broad context of responsible management, and corporate responsibility, the present paper studies the general issue of conflicts between private investors, and governments, with a particular focus on the investor--state dispute settlement through international arbitration. On the grounds of empirical research published by other scholars, particularly by Susan D. Franck, and Barbara Koremenos, the paper aims at explaining theoretically the underlying economic motives of the recent surge in the number of internationally arbitrated, investor--state disputes, and at predicting its future developments. Additionally, the theoretical findings are applied to evaluate some of the possible, institutional outcomes of the prospective Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The general conclusion is that not only isn't the international arbitration of investor--state disputes a threat to democracy, but also said arbitration helps to redress past infringements to public sovereignty.
Introduction
Responsible management, and corporate responsibility are both normative, and empirical issues. The normative approach assesses the deontology of corporate responsibility, with the three historically important orientations: liberal, welfarist, and technocratic. The liberal approach assumes that the main responsibility of the corporation is to assure predictable return on the capital invested, without any particular social responsibility concurring with that basic mission. The welfarist standpoint sees the corporation as the guarantor of a certain number of jobs, and its social responsibility refers mostly to social stability connected with the very existence (and the exact geographical location!) of said jobs, with a possible help to the less fortunate members of society. The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, which mostly takes the actual form of variously orchestrated charity, seems to be rooted in that welfarist view. Finally, the technocratic approach to the corporation accounts for the fact that business structures are tightly interconnected with infrastructural facilities, which, in turn, are vital for the security and stability of modern societies. The managerial concept of operational risk, born in the world of banking, and having successfully migrated into the broad universe of business organization, seems to reflect the actual measure of that technocratic grasp of corporate responsibility.
The empirical insight focuses on the actual patterns of corporate responsibility, and their evolution over time. A significant facet of that empirical view is the question about the possible future changes in the patterns of responsible management. One could ask, for example, whether we live in a de facto corporate social order, namely whether corporations rule the today's world, or if they will possibly rule the world of tomorrow.
From another perspective, one could ask whether opportunist, socially irresponsible strategies of corporations can lead to durable, social change, with a weakening of public sovereignty, and democracy. The answer to such broad questions far exceeds the scope of a research paper like this one. Yet, a partial answer focused upon a particular field of social life is possible.
If you want to see the possible changes, follow the critics, namely the critics of corporate governance and corporations in general. The investor--state dispute settlement (ISDS), which we define as the institution of international arbitration between private investors and their host states, treated as equals, is one of the main concerns from the part of various anti--corporatist movements. That general concern, expressed abundantly in mass media, finds its reflection in scientific, mostly legal research too (e.g. The very institution of investor--state dispute settlement, on the grounds of international treaties, is not quite new. First, let's trace the broad context. Since the 1960s, and maybe even earlier, foreign direct investment has been a major factor of economic development. Governments have developed a whole range of institutional tools to attract foreign investors. "Institutional" means that besides incidental actions (e.g. occasional privatisation), some more durable patterns of public policies (e.g. legal rules) have emerged. International treaties are among the most salient examples of institutional changes directed specifically on attracting foreign investors. The typical, legal construct that governments use consists of a certain number of bilateral investment treaties (BIT), which, in turn, refer to a set of rules contained in multilateral treaties. In order to encourage foreign investors, governments give them legal guarantees, or rights, both substantive and procedural. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention or the Convention), dating back to 1966, seems to be an institutional milestone for ISDS. Around that date, and after, both bilateral, and multilateral commercial treaties used to encompass a typical set of rights that governments guarantee to foreign, private investors. Those rights are both substantive, and procedural. Their general principle is that of a treatment not less favourable, from the point of view of the private investor, than the treatment available under international law (Guzman 1998; Franck 2008 If a social phenomenon is growing in importance, like the one presently discussed, there has to be some kind of logic to that. In other words, just saying that the growth of ISDS is a threat to democracy, and thus implicitly treating the phenomenon at hand as random, or conspiracy--based, seems irrational. There probably is an underlying social change, and the presently growing wave of ISDS is very much likely to be a symptom of what legal scholars call "system building" (Nottage 2006 Investors seem to be much more successful in the jurisdictional phase, whilst governments tend to win more frequently in the merits' phase. In the damages' phase, results are mixed. As a rule, the damages actually awarded to private investors are several times lower than their claims, on average 2 cents awarded on every dollar claimed. A significant majority of ISDS claims is related to businesses in the energy sector, and that of infrastructural services (e.g. water supply). 
The theoretical perspective
We start with a basic assumption that any hierarchical, social structure -states and corporations included --is able to sustain itself over long periods of time if it has both legitimation, and economic power. Legitimation is defined qualitatively, and quantitatively. On the one hand, it is a set of basic rights, and a set of actions to which the government is entitled. On the other hand, the qualitative scope of legitimation can be translated into some kind of quantitative index. Legitimation is grounded both in past When the mutual proportions between the amount of economic power, and the scope of legitimation slide out of a reasonably defined neighbourhood of equilibrium, two types of disequilibria can arise. Firstly, there can be economic power without or with very little legitimation. In this case, the given social entity controls an amount of capital, and has an amount of economic power significantly beyond the scope of legitimation. This is the case of Ali Baba's treasure. It gives significant, discretional power, but it is likely to destabilize the whole social structure. Secondly, there can be legitimation combined with disproportionately weak economic power. The given social agent is legitimately allowed to do things that he has no sufficient capital to perform. If the latter case is that of the government, there is an objectively observable need to acquire more capital in order to assure an economic power, which would be at least in correspondence with the scope of legitimation, possibly even greater.
A government with a legitimation exceeding its real economic power can acquire capital through three possible ways. It can forcefully take the possession of some assets, by sovereign decision, in the limits allowed by legitimation, of course. Let's call it "sovereign acquisition". The imposition of taxes is a classical example of that way, whilst the nationalisation of property rights is a more drastic one. The second possible path is public borrowing, whilst privatisation of assets is the third one.
Those three forms of increasing economic power confer to the government economic power of uneven quality, so to say. They have their mutual dynamics, too. The greater the gap between legitimation, and economic power, and, consequently, the lesser is the government's real political power, the lesser is the capacity for sovereign acquisition. If we don't have money to pay the wages of qualified clerks, we cannot hope to impose really collectable taxes. The lesser the capacity for sovereign acquisition, the lesser the capacity for public borrowing: money is lent mostly to those, who can pay it back with interest, hence who can efficiently impose and collect taxes. Those, whose ability to do so is doubtful, have significantly harder access to debt. If the gap between legitimation, and economic power is really wide, sovereign acquisition and public borrowings are quite limited ways to reduce it. Privatisation is frequently the name of the game in such situations.
Sovereign acquisition may increase the scope of legitimation, the same as public borrowing. With increasing tax revenues, and a good borrowing capacity, the government may claim some fields of social cooperation, for example through systematic public procurement, as it is the case in the sector of healthcare. Conversely, privatisation is likely to severe some fields of social action from the scope of the government's legitimation 24 . Thus, if we have a government in real need of economic power with quite a broad legitimation, yet poor in capital, a political time bomb starts ticking. Privatisation is likely to become massive, and irrational in terms of price, at which assets are transferred to the private sector. The price is to be understood broadly, not only as the lump sum of money paid by the private acquirer, but as the total balance of mutual obligations on the part of, respectively, the government, and the private investor. Politically forced, hasty privatisation leads to bad deals, which ultimately will bring a pressure on both the scope of legitimation, and the amount of economic power held by the government. Finally, the government comes to a point, where further loss of legitimation, inclusive of further privatisation, can lead it not to being a government anymore, and possibly to the disintegration of the state itself (e.g. Sudan). At this point, two alternative scenarios arise: entrenchment or reclaiming. The government can lock itself in that quite unimpressive ivory tower of residual sovereignty, and accept the position of barely a player among others. On the other hand, the government may attempt to reclaim some of the previously privatized assets. Reclaiming in this case is a broad concept, covering both the property rights strictly spoken, and the obligatory rights connected to some assets. The strategy of entrenchment is that of a weak government, which actually cannot fully enforce the rule of law, hence cannot properly 24 The course of social changes in Central and Eastern Europe is a good example of the latter mechanism. Massive privatization at the beginning of the 1990s seems to have permanently removed most fields of doing business from the scope of legitimation of the previously omnipresent governments.
protect property rights. Some investors may be expropriated, or otherwise disadvantaged at the benefit of some others, the tougher, smarter, and ones that are more influential. Yet, the government in place, as weak as it is, provides at least the simulacrum of legality to those unfair private deals. Should the reclaiming strategy dominate in public policy, the government is bound to take steps that put a clear brake to the amount of profits possible to make in connection with the previously privatized assets. Anyway, some private investors are hurt, and some arise.
That entire theoretical construct, as presented above, allows hypothesizing that both the recent surge in the number of investor--state disputes, and the specific quantitative pattern of these disputes are the delayed outcome of forceful, frequently irrationally quick privatisation, which was supposed to support the frail political position of newly emerging, post--colonial, and post--communist governments with additional capital.
Investor--state disputes seem to result mostly from either local struggles for power between private investors, poorly legitimized by local governments, or from active attempts, from the part of said local governments to regain the right to dispose of at least some of the previously privatized assets.
Illustrative case studies
In the realm of investor--state disputes, the cases against Argentina as respondent are almost a separate category. Both the sheer number of cases (more than 40), and their saliently repetitive characteristics make it a textbook--like example. In the early 1990s, the government of Argentina conducted an extensive privatisation in many sectors of the economy, energy and infrastructure included. The admission of foreign investors, and extensive foreign indebtedness of the government allowed the country as a whole to perform a civilizational leap forward. The so--called Convertibility Plan of 1991 pegged the Argentinian peso to the U.S. dollar, which, combined with privatization, created a unique opportunity for foreign investors: assets were much cheaper than in the developed countries, but the dollarized internal market almost guaranteed high returns on investment (see for example: Sturzenegger, Zettelmeyer 2006 25 ). Some ten years later, about the year 2000, a combination of external shocks and bad economic policy triggered a deep economic crisis, and great political instability. As addressing those exceptional circumstances, the government in place took several steps aiming both at giving a new kick to the sluggish economic growth, and at calming social unrest. One of the steps consisted in the so--called "pesification" of the economy (i.e. in backing off from the parity to U.S. dollar), and in freezing, temporarily, the prices of basic goods. Only then, the authorities realized how extensive were the rights that their predecessors had granted to foreign investors, and how brutal a reduction of those rights was necessary to implement the strategy designed for coping with the economic crisis. Some experts state firmly that the steps taken were justified by exceptional circumstances, and stayed within the limits of reasonably understood, public sovereignty (see for example: Burke--White 2008 26 ). Yet, an avalanche of disputes ensued, some of them landing at the level of through 1992, in some cases extending through 1996, went as far as guaranteeing to foreign investors non--decreasing, real selling prices to their customers. In the course of arbitration, the temporal horizon of these guarantees came into discussion, and the Claimant brought forth a very strong argumentation that the guarantee of prices was, in fact, ever lasting (!). No government can reasonably guarantee to a private investor, especially in the field of basic utility supplies, an ever--lasting margin of profitability. It is a breach to the basic logic of market economy. As assessed from the today's point of view, such a guarantee is at the limit of economic sanity, thus at the limit of the government's rational legitimacy, yet it was effectively given at the beginning of the Later on, successive Argentinian governments have been trying to reclaim that lost legitimacy, and, on the whole, they have been quite successful. Decisions of the ICSID tribunals, with significant merits awarded to various private claimants, and actual damages reduced to minimum, create a path of accomplished facts, through which the Argentinian state is progressively reclaiming the previously lost assets.
Argentine is a category in itself, and, in a general manner, illustrates the case of active reclaiming, from the part of the government, of the previously lost sovereignty, in connection with inconsiderate privatisation. Now, let's turn our attention somewhere else, to cases that enter into the "entrenchment" type of behaviour from the part of the government. An illustrative case is that of Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs, as Claimants, against the Republic of Georgia, as the Respondent 30 . This is maybe an even more striking example of the lengths, to which an emerging government can go in order to acquire at least some economic power. In 1991 and 1992, the newly created Republic of Georgia struggled for both international recognition, and at least minimum internal coherence. At that very moment, the Claimants managed to sign, with the government of the young republic, an incredibly advantageous contract, granting them, with a truly minuscule financial involvement from their part, the actual monopoly for the exploitation, and exportation of the domestic resources of oil, and natural gas. From the today's perspective, the contract was something of a miraculous deal for the Claimants; so miraculous that in normal, political circumstances no company, even among the biggest boys at the playground (e.g. BP or Shell) couldn't dream about anything even close to the terms of that contract. A witness statement, heard during the arbitration, is particularly illustrative for the circumstances, in which the contract was signed. The statement in question is that of Mr. Nanikashvili, a Georgian--born businessman living in Israel, who described the situation in the newly independent Georgia. For the sake of keeping the factual strength of the testimony, it is reported literally here below. As the Georgian political structure acquired more of a standing, successive governments took steps to back off from the contract with the Claimants. Finally, using the procedural faults, which really took place at the moment of starting the Claimants' business in 
Conclusion: the TTIP and investor--state disputes
Let's return to the question, whether the prospective signing of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, inclusive of the currently used dispositions as for the investor--state disputes, is a threat to democracy and public sovereignty. In a general manner, it doesn't seem to be. As demonstrated above, investor--state disputes as such do not impend public sovereignty. On the contrary, they contribute to building a relatively coherent system of rules as for settling the conflicts, which, in turn, result from previous breaches to public sovereignty. The TTIP, once it acquires any binding force, will involve mature, stable democracies. Even the youngest members of the European Union, namely the post--communist democracies of Central Europe, seem stable enough, at present, so as to avoid inconsiderate, massive privatisation. Thus, the main factor that What's important to understand in the context of that general conclusion is that the good faith from the part of private investors, inclusive of corporate responsibility, is not really important in that respect. Whether the big, transnational corporations be responsible or irresponsible in their strategies, the key factor of public sovereignty vis a vis those strategies is the proper balance between legitimation, and economic power of the governments in place. In political terms, we are talking about the balance of powers, and of efficiency, between respectively, the legislative, and the executive branch of the government. Especially, a weak legislative, coexisting with a highly efficient, and autonomous executive branch, can create dangerous disproportions between legitimation, and economic power. In the general case of European governments, the most likely to happen is the Ali Baba's syndrome. If the executive branch is in the actual possession of valuable assets, with the legislative lagging behind as for sovereign supervision, abusive transfers of property rights may take place. That, in turn, can ultimately lead to lost disputes against private investors.
